Legal protection by design: objections and refutations by Hildebrandt, M.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a preprint version which may differ from the publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/91998
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2019-12-04 and may be subject to
change.
 This paper was presented at the symposium REGULATION BY TECHNOLOGY at the 
Netherlands Academy for Legislation, The Hague, on Friday 4th February 2011. A somewhat 
revised version has been published as: 
‘Legal protection by design: objections and refutations’, (5) Legisprudence 2011-2, p. 223-
248, available at 
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/legis/2011/00000005/00000002/art00004  
 
 
Challenges for a Vision of Ambient Law 
Mireille Hildebrandt 
 
To Microsoft, Kinect is not just a game, but a step toward the future of computing. ‘It’s a 
world where technology more fundamentally understands you, so you don’t have to 
understand it’.1 
 
Abstract 
To cope with an increasingly proactive technological infrastructure a so-called ‘vision 
of Ambient Law’ has been proposed. It entails that lawyers and legislators should 
learn to articulate legal protection into the digital environment. It implies that rights to 
privacy, due process and non-discrimination warrant effective remedies beyond the 
written law. The lawmakers’ Pavlov response of introducing yet another set of 
administrative rules will not protect the inhabitants of smart environments, such as the 
Internet of Things or Ambient Intelligence. Neither will industry’s self-regulation 
achieve adequate protection if citizens are not involved in the assessment of the 
infrastructure that enables proactive computation. Instead, an Ambient Law should be 
developed that enables ‘legal protection by design’. This vision of Ambient Law 
builds on similar notions within the domain of ethics of technology (eg privacy by 
design, privacy by default, value-sensitive design).  
Expanding on previous publications this paper engages with three possible objections. 
Firstly, some authors favour so-called technology-neutral regulations; they think that 
regulators should avoid technology dependence when formulating legal norms. 
Second, some authors might equate this approach with taking a ‘command-and-
control’ perspective; they assume that the intervention of the democratic legislator 
actually implies a top down perspective, compared to e.g. public-private cooperation. 
                                                
1 Steve Lohr, "Computers That See You and Keep Watch over You," The New York Times January 1, 
2011. 
Third, some authors equate the idea of Ambient Law with technological enforcement 
of administrative law, suggesting that Ambient Law merely uses technology to 
enforce legal rules. I will argue that all three objections misconstrue the notion of 
Ambient Law, and miss the point that law-as-we-know-it is already technologically 
embodied. Moving from the technologies of the script to those of mobile 
interconnected digital computer systems requires creative re-enactment of legal norms 
into the novel infrastructures. 
 
1 Proactive computational infrastructures: we are being ‘read’ 
This contribution is focused on the legal implications of a novel socio-technical 
landscape that may have far reaching consequences for the way the law ‘works’. The 
landscape I refer to is not merely a matter of digitalization (computers) or online 
connectivity (the Internet) but concerns the emergence of smart online and offline 
environments. Smart can mean many things, but here I will use the term to refer to 
computing systems that are capable of anticipating human behaviours on the basis of 
sophisticated statistical inferences. The computational ‘intestines’ of smart 
environments afford personalized services, based on pattern-recognition in big data-
sets. If your data match a relevant pattern you will be profiled as having particular 
preferences, or as being prone to particular risks.  
Behavioural advertising is a first sign of online personalisation and anticipation. It is 
based on extensive web statistics, such as those offered by Google Analytics.2 This 
allows a website or an advertiser network to log all the behaviours of a website’s 
visitors, including from which site or search engine they ‘landed on’ the site, how 
long they remain on a certain page, to what other pages they click, from which 
geographical location they arrive, what IP number they use, what other surfing 
behaviours they exhibit and possibly what keystroke and mouse-click behaviour they 
express (behavioural biometrics that render a person re-recognizable). This enables 
advertising networks to correlate all kinds of trivial online behaviour with online 
buying behaviour, thus providing advertisers with practical knowledge about their 
clients without a need for personal data such as name and address. As long as the 
profiler ‘knows’ what kind of person you are, and which offers might trigger your 
buying behaviours, advertisers can calculate which ads might bring them a profit.  
Offline smartness is foreseen for ‘smart homes’, the ‘smart grid’, ‘smart traffic 
management’, ‘smart offices’ and the more.3 The designers of Ambient Intelligence 
and the Internet of Things claim that these habitats will cater to our inferred 
preferences, capabilities or health-risks even before we become of aware of them.4 
                                                
2 Brian Clifton, Advanced Web Metrics with Google Analytics, 2nd ed., Serious Skills (Indianapolis, 
Ind.: Wiley Pub., 2010). See also the Opinion of the Art. 29 Working Party. 
3 Diane Cook and Sajal K. Das, Smart Environments : Technologies, Protocols, and Applications 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2005). 
4 Emile Aarts and Stefano Marzano, eds., The New Everyday. Views on Ambient Intelligence 
(Rotterdam: 010,2003), ITU, "The Internet of Things," (Geneva: International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), 2005). ISTAG, "Scenarios for Ambient Intelligence in 2010," (Information Society 
Technology Advisory Group, 2001). 
One day they might even predict a propensity for criminal conduct on the basis of 
correlatable data such as DNA, behavioural biometrics, emotion detection, long term 
health records and detailed school records. Hidden complexity, ubiquity, 
pervasiveness, seamless adaptation and proactive adjustment are the buzzwords of 
these novel infrastructures. They do not rely on ‘stand-alone’ devices but thrive on a 
continuous interconnectivity that allows for the capture and storage of an enormous 
amount of trivial data which are then mined for relevant patterns. Radio frequency 
identification (RFID) systems, combined with sensor technologies and wireless 
connectivity will provide ‘big data’ about mobility, temperature, facial expression, 
sound and speech, gait, one’s history of previous behaviour in the same smart 
environment or even one’s history of previous behaviours in other smart 
environments. They might even recognise emotional states from facial gestures or 
gait.5 
The Kinect application is a good example of how the offline world will be ‘turned 
online’, as it communicates a person’s physical behaviours in the form of machine-
readable data to Microsoft’s Windows Azure Platform to be further mined and 
analyzed.6 The Kinect is a computer game that can be played by providing ‘natural 
user input’ such as voice and gestures, instead of a keyboard or joystick. The 
application uses a webcam and a microphone to collect machine-readable behavioural 
data of a user, which are then mined real-time in order to profile the user’s 
interactions with what is on-screen. The Azure Platform is used to improve the 
software and further enrich the user experience. Note that the mantra for designing 
successful technologies has moved from ‘increasing the functionality’ to ‘improving 
the usability’ to ‘augmenting or enriching the user experience’.7 There is an acute 
awareness that for users to seamlessly interact with a smart application, they should 
not be asked to provide deliberate input via a separate interface but must be given the 
chance to employ the environment itself as an interface. Kinect shows what it means 
to directly interact with a smart environment, learning to anticipate how the 
application anticipates one’s participation in an entirely intuitive manner. The 
communication between what happens on- and off-screen mainly takes place at a 
subliminal level, thus achieving a more smooth and ‘natural’ experience. This is how 
smart environments are meant to function, provoking effective mutual anticipations 
between a person and her smart environment, allowing her to participate in creating 
the intelligence of the system.8 Instead of merely pre-empting a user and providing 
her with what she is inferred to prefer, there is a sustained interaction that 
unubtrusively engages a person as co-creator of a shared environment.  
Despite the user-centric narrative about smart environments, many authors have 
doubts about what this means in practical terms. The emphasis on ubiquity, 
                                                
5 Rosalind Picard, Affective Computing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). 
6 The Kinect Privacy and Online Safety FAQs explain: ‘Data collected through use of Kinect is stored 
on Microsoft’s Windows Azure platform for up to three months, after which it will be deleted. During 
that three-month period, the data will be held for analysis purposes. If chosen for analysis, the data will 
be rendered into an anonymous state before use.’ See http://www.xbox.com/en-
US/Kinect/PrivacyandOnlineSafety#DataCollection7 (last visited 30 January 2011). 
7 See also Mike Kuniavsky, Smart Things : Ubiquitous Computing User Experience Design 
(Amsterdam ; Boston: Morgan Kaufmann Publisher, 2010). 
8 Emile Aarts and Frits Grotenhuis, "Ambient Intelligence 2.0: Towards Synergetic Prosperity," in Ami 
2009, ed. Manfred Tscheligi, et al. (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2009). 
unobtrusiveness and the reiterated notion that these environments will cater to your 
wishes before you become aware of them seems to approach the human subject as an 
information object. Her preferences, life style, health and other risks are calculated 
based on advanced knowledge discovery in databases (KDD). To the extent that some 
of your relevant data match with patterns mined from these databases, you will be 
treated in a manner that is expected to fit your profile. Obviously this is not done for 
reasons of philanthropy but to persuade you to buy into the services offered by those 
who hope to make a profit by selling them. This sounds like as if the user is invited to 
participate only insofar as this will allow for more accurate predictions of her future 
behaviours, not to critically examine the correctness or the completeness of the 
profiles that underlie the way she is being served.  
From the perspective of law and legislation it is important to note that smart 
environments require a networked technological infrastructure, whose computational 
complexity is hidden beneath the surface that ‘acts’ as the interface. There is a novel 
type of invisible visibility that pervades the ensuing mechanism of proactive 
servicing.9 Whereas data analysis produces a new visibility of individual citizens 
based on the application of refined personalised group profiles, citizens themselves 
stumble upon a new invisibility. Both the software that creates personalised services 
and the group profiles it mines are protected by the law on trade secrets or that on 
intellectual property rights. Moreover, the complexity of the algorithms, neural 
networks or multi-agent systems involved obstructs an effective understanding of the 
bias and assumptions built into the models used for data mining.10 Merely attributing 
transparency or privacy rights will not solve this problem.  
 
2 Privacy, due process and non-discrimination 
Much has been written about the legal and ethical implications of smart environments, 
notably on violations of privacy and refined and invisible forms of discrimination.11 
In this contribution I will briefly reiterate the argument that the usual interpretations 
                                                
9 M Hildebrandt, "Who Is Profiling Who? Invisible Visibility," in Reinventing Data Protection?, ed. S 
Gutwirth, et al. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009). 
10 Technically speaking any type of data mining has inherent biases, meaning that any dataset can be 
mined in different ways with different outcomes. D Sculley and Bradley M Pasanek, "Meaning and 
Mining: The Impact of Implicit Assumptions in Data Mining for the Humanities," Literary and 
Linguistic Computing 23, no. 4 (2008). 
11 Jurgen Bohn et al., "Social, Economic, and Ethical Implications of Ambient Intelligence and 
Ubiquitous Computing," in Ambient Intelligence, ed. W. Weber, J. Rabaey, and E. Aarts (Zurich: 
Springer, 2005), Daniel J. Solove, "Conceptualizing Privacy," California Law Review 90 (2002), Tal Z. 
Zarsky, ""Mine Your Own Business!": Making the Case for the Implications of the Data Mining or 
Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion," Yale Journal of Law & Technology 5, no. 4 
(2002-2003), David Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting : Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination 
(London ; New York: Routledge, 2003). Andrew Odlyzko, "Privacy, Economics, and Price 
Discrimination on the Internet," in Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic 
commerce (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: ACM, 2003). Anton Vedder, "Kdd: The Challenge to 
Individualism," Ethics and Information Technology 1 (1999), Bart Custers, The Power of Knowledge. 
Ethical, Legal, and Technological Aspects of Data Mining and Group Profiling in Epidemiology 
(Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2004). Helen Fay Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context : Technology, 
Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Law Books, 2010). 
of privacy as individual control over or restricted access to personal information will 
not protect our privacy in a smart environment.12 I will highlight the nexus between 
privacy, identity and some of the worries over social sorting and undesirable 
discrimination, while also noting that due process may be the biggest concern here.13  
With regard to predictive profiling, there is a flaw in viewing privacy from the 
perspective of methodological individualism. The major problem is that it puts the 
burden of protecting privacy on the shoulders of individual inhabitants of smart 
environments, enabling them to trade their stake in what is also a public good. First, 
this flaw is connected with the pitfalls of regarding an individual as a sovereign in 
charge of disseminating personal data. Sovereignty assumes independence, both 
between states and within the state. Though this has been a very productive legal 
fiction in international law,14 it is not – and never was - an accurate description of the 
nation state. Similarly, the control paradigm inherent in the idea of the person as a 
sovereign who rules her own thoughts, actions and decisions presumes an 
independence and a transparency that is not at hand. A large part of our inner life and 
interactions is co-constituted by unconscious processes and by the process of 
anticipating how others will ‘read’ our actions.15 Nevertheless, acknowledging the 
relational and relative nature of individual personhood does not rule out a measure of 
autonomy that does make the difference between a person who can and an individual 
who cannot be called to account for her actions.16 The problem with viewing a person 
as being in complete control over her personal information is that it denies the fact 
that all information is inherently relational: my name is of interest because others can 
use it to address me; Robinson Crusoe would not need or in fact ‘have’ a name insofar 
as he were to remain alone on his island. The fact that information is relational, 
however, does not imply that anybody necessarily has access to every bit of 
information that concerns me. Nor does it imply that I cannot hide information about 
myself or should not be able to prevent others from inferring information about 
myself that I could not possibly infer by myself. For instance, risk profiles based on 
how my DNA matches genomic profiles or on how my web-surf behaviour matches 
with customer profiles that determine credit worthiness may have a far reaching 
impact on my capabilities, though I may not be aware of this and therefore have no 
way of contesting their validity and relevance. Privacy as a form personal sovereignty 
may work in an environment where it is easy to foresee the consequences of sharing 
one’s information; in a habitat that nourishes on information sharing and data 
correlation such a conception of privacy cannot protect us. 
                                                
12 E.g. M. Hildebrandt, "Profiling and the Identity of the European Citizen," in Profiling the European 
Citizen. Cross-Discplinary Perspectives, ed. M. Hildebrandt and S Gutwirth (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2008). 
13 Cf. Daniel J. Steinbock, "Data Matching, Data Mining and Due Process," Georgia Law Review 40, 
no. 1 (2005). 
14 On the reality and force of legal fictions, see John Dewey, "The Historic Background of Corporate 
Legal Personality," The Yale Law Journal 35, no. 6 (1926). 
15 Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman, and John A. Bargh, The New Unconscious, Oxford Series in Social 
Cognition and Social Neuroscience (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). On the double 
contingency that constitutes social interaction: Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995). 
16 On the possibility of autonomy from the perspective of cognitive science: Antonio R. Damasio, Self 
Comes to Mind : Constructing the Conscious Brain (New York: Pantheon Books). From the 
perspective of moral philosophy: Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 1st ed. (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2005). 
Second, this flaw relates to seeing privacy as a private interest, whereas it is also a 
crucial public good that in fact aims to produce a space for individuals to pursue their 
own interests. Privacy as a form of negative freedom (freedom from), is a recent 
invention. Historically speaking, positive freedom (freedom to) has been around much 
longer,17 depicting the freedom of those engaged in political action as opposed to the 
unfreedom of the private life that was constraint by the norms of the household 
(oikos). The idea that private life is a domain of liberty is a modern invention,18 dating 
from the age of the printing press with its celebration of the silent reading of an 
increasing number of printed texts. In a way, the development of privacy as a means 
to retreat from social interaction is an affordance – some would say a side effect – of 
the era of the printing press.19  Privacy in this sense cannot be taken for granted once 
the information and communication infrastructures are transformed from those of the 
printing press to those of the electronic age, the digital era, the profusion of 
interconnectivity and finally to those of the computational turn. Privacy as a public 
good is deeply entwined with the legal framework of constitutional democracy, as it 
aims to protect individual citizens from suffering the ‘tyranny of public opinion’ or 
the force of authoritarian government rule.20 It is both constitutive for a resilient civil 
society and constituted by a legal framework that enables individual citizens to 
contest the way they are categorised, addressed or identified. Approaching privacy as 
a private interest easily ignores the fact that privacy depends on a social fabric and a 
legal framework that builds institutional gaps between different contexts, thus 
allowing a person to establish a dynamic and flexible multi-faced identity.  
Agre & Rotenberg have defined the right to privacy as: 
The freedom from unreasonable constraints in the construction of once’s 
identity.21 
This is interesting for six reasons. First, this definition acknowledges that identity is 
not given, but the ephemeral result of a dynamic process. Second, it confirms negative 
freedom (freedom from) as the core of privacy, while – third – not every constraint is 
seen as a violation but only unreasonable constraints. Fourth, the constraints concern 
positive freedom (freedom to), thus providing a broader perspective to the concept of 
freedom instead of reducing it to the freedom to act arbitrarily. Fifth, the definition 
links privacy with the development of one’s identity, while – sixth – understanding 
identity as inherently relational. This highlights the importance of context: who we 
are is co-determined by the context we engage with. If the context takes away the 
                                                
17 Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Four Essays on Liberty, ed. Isaiah Berlin (Oxford New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1969/1958). 
18 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago London: University Press of  Chicago, 1958). 
19 Felix Stalder, "The Failure of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (Pets) and the Voiding of Privacy," 
Sociological Research Online 7, no. 2 (2002). 
20 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Penguin, (1859) 1974). Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, 
Thomas Nugent, and J. V. Prichard, The Spirit of the Laws, 2 vols. (New York ; London: Appleton, 
1912).  
21 Philip E. Agre and Marc Rotenberg, eds., Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT,2001)., at 7. 
possibility to foresee how we are being anticipated, the freedom to develop our 
identity is at stake.22 
In the era of profiling this seems a more apt way to define privacy. The use of inferred 
profiles does not depend on personal data; the profiles are often inferred from 
anonymised data and do not refer to a particular person or even a particular group of 
persons. They usually concern non-distributive profiles, meaning that though the 
statistical inference is correct at the level of the dataset, it does not necessarily apply 
to those who fit the profile. This may sound counterintuitive but in fact it is not very 
surprising. If the average chance for all women to develop breast cancer is 12%, this 
does not imply that the chance to develop breast cancer is 12% for each and every 
woman. These chances will differ depending on other factors, such as genetic make-
up, life-style, age and the more. If non-distributive profiles are applied to the 
inhabitants of smart environments their privacy may be implicated in several ways. 
First, to the extent that the profile is correct but the person is not aware of its content 
her capability to contest its relevance is denied. Second, to the extent that the profile 
is incorrect the person may end up responding to her treatment and thus reinforcing 
the profile. Paraphrasing Merton we could say that ‘if machines define a situation as 
real it is real in its consequences’.23 Precisely because smart environments thrive on 
subliminal interventions this might constitute a major invasion of a person’s privacy 
in the sense of Agre & Rotenberg; the profiles that determine the proactive behaviours 
of the environment easily constrain the construction of identity in way that is 
unreasonable because incorrect and/or invisible. One’s identity is unconsciously 
shaped by the continuous anticipations of smart fridges, intelligent filtering of 
incoming messages, adaptive traffic management or pre-emptive health monitoring. 
Dwyer has named this as the ‘inference problem’, which can be described as the fact 
that we are being ‘read’ whereas we don’t know how and by whom we are being 
‘read’.24 It related to the fact that though data protection legislation celebrates the 
purpose specification and the purpose limitation principle, ubiquitous computing and 
smart environments thrive on a productive function creep;25 unexpected correlations 
that spring from bottom-up data mining will provide added value, they will keep the 
environment smart. Sticking to preconceived notions of what the purpose of a specific 
data mining operation will be would be against the paradigm of proactive and 
autonomic computing. 
Being profiled in one way or another, correctly or incorrectly, wrongly or rightly, 
fairly or unfairly, also relates to the value of non-discrimination. Profiling is geared 
towards inclusion or exclusion in a very refined and sophisticated manner, thus 
allowing for personalised discrimination as to price, type and level of service, access 
to information, employment, healthcare or insurance. This type of discrimination is 
                                                
22 See also M. Hildebrandt, Who needs stories if you can get the data? ISPs and the ethics of big data 
crunching, paper presented at the seminar of 11th February 2011 on ISPs’ responsibility, organised by 
Luciano Floridi, Oxford University. 
23 Robert K. Merton, "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy," The Antioch Review 8, no. 2 (1948). This is 
referred to as the Thomas Theorem, cf. W I Thomas and D S Thomas, The Child in America (New 
York: Knopf, 1928). 
24 Catherine Dwyer, "The Inference Problem and Pervasive Computing," in Proceedings of Internet 
Research 10.0 (Milwaukee, WI: 2009). 
25 Betsy Massiello and Alma Whitten, "Engineering Privacy in a Age of Information Abundance," in 
Intelligent Information Privacy Management (AAAI, 2010). at 120. 
not new and much has been written about how everyday profiling basically springs 
from our bounded rationality, giving us a chance to use of our cognitive resources in 
an economical manner, and about how data mining allows for extensive price-
discrimination that is not illegal nor always undesirable from the perspective of 
individual consumers.26 The kind of discrimination that is at stake in smart 
environments is not necessarily related to the human right of non-discrimination and 
equal treatment, which refers to gender, race, ethnicity or religion. Nevertheless, 
profiling can easily create the means to discriminate people on the basis of trivial data 
that correlate with forbidden grounds of discrimination (called masking).27 That way 
the discrimination is indirect and may be difficult to prove. However, the effects of 
being able to segment customers, tax-payers, job applicants, patients, offenders, 
suspects and citizens in general on the basis of non-distributive profiles has far 
reaching consequences that link discrimination with privacy. Being targeted as a 
certain type of person without knowing what the environment knows, could provide a 
person with a false sense of autonomy. Though she makes her decisions without 
visible constraints, the options have been formatted to fit her inferred inclinations. 
And to the extent that the environment decides on behalf of its inhabitants – like a 
discrete and well-trained butler – the inhabitants may actually begin to want what the 
environment has calculated to be their very own desire. Zarsky has coined this as the 
‘autonomy-trap’.28 
At some point all these subliminal interventions could turn us into a cognitive 
resource for the smart environment, instead of the other way round. As with Kinect 
the environment may ‘understand’ us, whereas we have no clue about its mindless 
‘inner’ workings, purposes or its machine-to-machine interactions with other smart 
environments. In this sense due process is the main problem. I use the term here to 
denote a person’s ability to contest the way she is treated and to have equal access to 
‘knowledge’ that determined how she was treated. In the tradition of art. 6 
(concerning the fair trial) of the ECHR this is called ‘equality of arms’, meaning that 
a defendant is brought into a position that makes possible an effective defence. The 
computational turn that is a condition of possibility for smart environments creates a 
novel asymmetry of knowledge and information, even if this is ‘sold’ as hidden 
complexity, seamless interfacing and user-centric modelling. This knowledge 
asymmetry cannot easily be solved by means of written law. It requires a re-
articulation of fundamental rights as defaults into the ICT infrastructure that could 
otherwise erase the possibility to exercise these rights.  
 
                                                
26 Frederick Schauer, Profiles Probabilities and Stereotypes (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 
England: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003). Odlyzko, "Privacy, Economics, and Price 
Discrimination on the Internet."  
27 Custers, The Power of Knowledge. Ethical, Legal, and Technological Aspects of Data Mining and 
Group Profiling in Epidemiology. 
28 Zarsky, ""Mine Your Own Business!": Making the Case for the Implications of the Data Mining or 
Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion." 
3 Ambient Law: legal protection by design 
In several publications the notion of Ambient Law has been put forward as a way to 
re-establish the Rule of Law in an Ambient Intelligent or smart environment.29 In the 
context of a constitutional democracy the Rule of Law has at least two requirements. 
First, the scope and the content of the law are determined by a democratic legislator. 
Second, the final decision on what constitutes the correct interpretation of the law is 
in the hand of the courts. Iudex – non rex – est lex loqui.30 This means that individual 
citizens have a means to challenge the administration’s interpretation of enacted law, 
thus preventing a rule by law that employs the law as a neutral instrument to achieve 
the goals of policy makers. Instead, constitutional democracy entails that enacted law 
is seen as an instrument to achieve the goals of the democratic legislator, whereby the 
instrument embodies the constitutional constraints that are inherent in the Rule of 
Law. In other words, to count as law as opposed to mere administration or discipline, 
legal instruments must pass the test of aiming to achieve legal certainty, justice and 
purposiveness – even if it is clear that these goals may turn out to be incompatible in a 
specific case.31 
The concept of Ambient Law (AmLaw) builds on notions such as value sensitive 
design, privacy by design and values in design.32 It can be understood as ‘legal 
protection by design’. I avoid terms like ‘implementation’ or ‘enforcement’ because 
AmLaw should not be mistaken for a rule by technology, merely using technological 
devices to enforce written legal norms. In fact I challenge the separation of means and 
ends that informs such a view of the relationship between law and technology.33 
Technology often has normative implications, also when they are not deliberately 
designed.34 Though this is usually obscured by referring to these implications as side-
effects, it reminds us that we must always carefully investigate to what extent a 
specific technology has affordances that interfere with the purpose for which it has 
been designed. Also, the affordances of new technologies may interfere with existing 
                                                
29 Mireille Hildebrandt, "A Vision of Ambient Law," in Regulating Technologies, ed. Roger 
Brownsword and Karen Yeung (Oxford: Hart, 2008), M. Hildebrandt and Bert-Jaap Koops, "A Vision 
of Ambient Law. Fidis Deliverable 7.9," (Brussels: FIDIS NoE (Future of Identity in Information 
Society, an EU funded Network of Excellence), 2007), M Hildebrandt and B.J. Koops, "The 
Challenges of Ambient Law and Legal Protection in the Profiling Era," Modern Law Review 73, no. 3 
(2010). 
30 K.M. Schoenfeld, "Rex, Lex Et Judex: Montesquieu and La Bouche De La Loi Revisted," European 
Constitutional Law Review 4 (2008). 
31 On means and ends: John Dewey, "The Logic of Judgments of Practice Chapter 14," in Essays in 
Experimental Logic, ed. John Dewey (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1916). On legal certainty, 
justice and purposiveness as the focus of law: Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie. Herausgegeven 
Von Erik Wolf (Stuttgart: Koehler, 1950), Heather Leawoods, "Gustav Radbruch: An Extraordinary 
Legal Philosopher," Journal of Law and Policy 2 (2000). 
32 M. Flanagan, D. Howe, and Helen Nissenbaum, "Values in Design: Theory and Practice," in 
Information Technology and Moral Philosophy, ed. Jeroen Van den Hoven and John Weckert 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Marc Langheinrich, "Privacy by Design - Principles 
of Privacy-Aware Ubiquitous Systems," in Proc. 3rd. Int'l Conf. Ubquitous Computing (Springer, 
2001). Batya Friedman, Peter H. Jr. Kahn, and Alan Borning, "Value Sensitive Desing and Information 
Systems," in The Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics, ed. Kenneth Einar Himma and 
Herman T. Tavani (New York: Wiley, 2008). 
33 Dewey, "The Logic of Judgments of Practice Chapter 14.". 
34 M. Hildebrandt, "Legal and Technological Normativity: More (and Less) Than Twin Sisters," 
Techné: Journal of the Society for Philosophy and Technology 12, no. 3 (2008). 
legal norms, turning legal rights into paper dragons because it becomes increasingly 
difficult to exercise these rights. For instance, if the data protection directive D 
95/46/EC provides a right of access to the logic of processing (art. 12) in the case of 
automated decisions, whereas it is technically impossible to provide such access in a 
way that is comprehensible for ordinary citizens, then the normativity that is inherent 
in the computational infrastructure will overrule the normativity of the written law. 
AmLaw suggests that to count as an effective remedy this legal norm will have to be 
inscribed at the level of the infrastructure, designing it in a way that provides adequate 
transparency in an intuitive way.35  
Ambient Law takes into account that modern law has evolved from the information 
and communication infrastructure of the printing press, creating a body of written 
legal rules, written case law and doctrinal treatises that determines the substance of 
positive law. The systematic nature of modern legal systems builds on the need for 
systemisation, rationalisation and linear thinking that is inherent in the affordances of 
the printing press.36 This has also triggered the growth of a class of legal professionals 
with the task of maintaining legal certainty in the face of proliferating legal texts 
(codes, cases, treaties and doctrine). The structure of modern law, with its emphasis 
on separate national jurisdictions, institutionalised appeal, constitutional review, litis 
finiri oportet, and the separation of legislator, administration and courts, has 
nourished the law as a relatively autonomous domain. This has eventually turned the 
rule by law that was typical for absolutism into the rule of law that is typical for 
constitutional democracy. Speaking of autonomous law does not, however, imply that 
law could ever function as a ‘stand-alone device’. Rather, under the Rule of Law the 
legal system acts as a buffer between ruler and ruled, creating the possibility to 
contest state-authority in an appeal to a court that is in fact supported by the authority 
of the state (the paradox of the Rechtsstaat). Ambient Law acknowledges that all this 
cannot be taken for granted, because the Rule of Law is not only a historical artefact 
but also closely connected to a specific ICT infrastructure that may soon be overruled 
by another. If we want to sustain the rights and freedoms that developed with modern 
legal systems, legislators need to engage in the design of the novel computational 
infrastructures, taking care that they at least provide effective legal protection against 
their own omniscience and their capability to enforce a normativity that goes against 
the grain of constitutional democracy.  
Hereunder I will discuss three objections against the vision of Ambient Law, hoping 
this will further clarify how Ambient Law relates to traditional written law and to 
technological enforcement of legal norms (which equals administration or discipline).  
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4 Three potential objections 
4.1 Technology-neutral legislation 
There is an interesting debate on the extent to which legislation should be technology-
neutral, and what this means. Several authors have pointed to the different meanings 
that underlie the policy-makers use of the concept.37 Sometimes the concept is 
understood as relating to the goal of the legislation (non-discrimination, privacy 
protection, innovation, protection of intellectual property, ownership, retribution for a 
criminal wrong), but often enough it seems to refer to a general market-driven 
approach that sees legislation as a tool to stimulate innovation (rejecting legislation 
that discriminates between different technologies). Another goal is the wish to enact 
legislation that is ‘future-proof’,38 not requiring reiterate adjustments when new 
technologies come to the market. 
If technology-neutral legislation means that a legal norm should have similar effects 
independent of the technology involved, we need to acknowledge  
that technologically neutral rules addressing the same issue may well differ 
in their wording and content, in order to achieve the same (or at least broadly 
equivalent) effects when applied to these technologies.39 
From this perspective, in drafting effective technology-neutral legislation the 
legislator cannot afford indifference towards the available technologies; instead 
special attention is needed to avoid unwarranted consequences.  
If technology-neutral legislation means that legal norms should not favour or 
discriminate between different technologies, in order to allow ‘the market’ to do its 
job, one could speak of ‘technology indifferent laws’. However, 
Technology indifferent drafting may be an effective technique where the 
behaviour to be controlled, or the effects to be mandated or prohibited, are 
not made different in kind by the means adopted by the regulated actor. 
Where, though, the use of technology fundamentally changes the nature of 
the behaviour, or means that the effects of that behaviour are different or 
have different consequences, alternative mechanisms for achieving 
technology neutrality are required.40 
For instance, within the domain of the criminal law one should only explicitly target 
particular technologies if they generate novel types of crimes or offences. It makes no 
sense to enact a new criminalization for killing a person by hitting her on the head 
with a personal computer, as it already falls within the scope of manslaughter or 
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murder. It does make sense to criminalize the hacking of a computer, because neither 
trespass nor theft entirely cover the act of entering a computer-system without the 
consent of its owner, perhaps also breaking the security and/or copying or even 
changing its content.41  
What matters is that new technologies often afford actions and practices that were not 
possible before their invention. For instance, an e-book that allows the reader to 
search the entire book for particular words creates a type of transparency that was not 
available in a hardcopy, as this supports only a restricted version of such transparency 
by means of an index. The digital humanities have begun to discover how this affords 
entirely novel types of scientific research. Similarly, this kind of searcheability will at 
some point change the nature of legal research, for instance because it will allow data 
miners to come up with all kinds of abductive knowledge for classification, reasoning 
strategies and the like.42 To the extent that new technologies have consequences that 
need redress which is not available within the existing legal framework it makes sense 
to address either their designers, users, retailers or end-users with legislation that 
clarifies ownership, tort or criminal liability, intellectual property rights or means of 
validation (e.g. in the case of the digital signature). In line with the systematic nature 
of modern law the legislator will attempt to tackle this by means of general norms that 
can be applied across different fields of application, serving the coherence of the legal 
framework and the legal certainty for individual citizens. 
Ambient law is not concerned with enacting new legal norms in order to regulate new 
technologies. It is not about regulating computers, the Internet or smart environments. 
In that sense it is not cyberlaw or law in cyberspace. It does not focus on technologies 
as an object of regulation. Ambient law starts from the proposition that ‘technology is 
neither bad nor good, but never neutral’.43 From the perspective of philosophy of 
technology this means that it does not succumb to either techno-optimism or techno-
pessimism; whether a particular technology is bad or good depends on which 
normative implications it has and how this is evaluated. This requires empirical 
research and moral assessment. The fact that technology is never neutral refers to the 
fact that any technology has normative force in the sense that is induces or enforces 
specific behaviour patterns and/or inhibits or rules out specific behaviour patterns.44 
The term normativity denotes more than mere regularity but less than morality: speed 
bumps generate slow driving, books generate silent reading, the Internet triggers peer-
to-peer file sharing, the Forum Romanum generated a hierarchical distinction between 
speaker and audience, the Greek Agora triggered peer-to-peer discussions on the 
marketplace, artificial light generated longer working hours, Western music notation 
generated harmony and counterpoint, letters of credit generated trade beyond the local 
environment and finally generated paper money.45 The normativity of technological 
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devices or infrastructures does not depend on deliberate design; though people can 
delegate tasks to technology the ‘real’ workings often turn out different, since a 
technology usually affords more than its intended functionality. That is why AmLaw 
does not assume that technology is necessarily deterministic of human behaviour. 
Mostly, a technology can be engaged in a variety of ways, though at some point its 
usage is consolidated and people will tune their expectations to what turns out to be 
‘normal’. In that sense the normal or the ‘default’ has strong normative force,46 
though it must not be confused with moral force. Depending on its design a particular 
technology can overrule alternative action, forcing a person to act in a specific way. If 
a smart car will not start when the driver is under the influence of alcohol, it forces 
the driver’s hand and is in that sense deterministic. However, if the car is design such 
that it warns the driver instead of overruling her action, it is not deterministic. In brief, 
Ambient Law does not regard technological infrastructures as necessarily 
deterministic, nor as inherently good or bad, but neither does it view them as neutral 
tools that can only be assessed in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. 
Ambient Law is not concerned with technology as an object of regulation, but first of 
all with the prevailing ICT infrastructure as a subject of regulation (as a regulator). 
The computational infrastructure on which smart environments feed will regulate our 
lives in a number of ways: it will predict health and other risks, it will calculate our 
educational, occupational or professional capabilities, measure our resilience in the 
face of stress or exhaustion, predict the likelihood of violent behaviour or criminal 
offences and all this will allow the smart environment to unobtrusively include or 
exclude us from certain services, products, insurance, housing, education, profession 
and it will allow the smart environment to prohibit or provide access to physical or 
online domains. Note once again that the computational infrastructure will not force 
smart environments to act one way or another; there is no determinism here. But it 
would be very naïve not to acknowledge that these affordances change the playing 
field, the incentive structure and thus require us to re-install check and balances to 
counter undesirable defaults.   
Ambient Law does not consider the ICT infrastructure that generates and channels 
communication and information flows to be a neutral tool. As an instrument of 
sharing and shaping meaning, enhancing and restricting the perception and cognition 
of individuals, groups, companies, governmental agencies and other organisations the 
ICT infrastructure is both constitutive and regulative of human societies. Moving 
from one type of infrastructure to the next has major consequences for the manner in 
which legal authority and normativity can be sustained. For lawyers and legislators it 
may be too obvious to note that modern law is in fact technologically embodied, 
namely in the technology of the script and the printing press.47 It is even more 
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difficult to discover the implications of law’s present focus on legal text and the 
subsequent implications of a shift towards images, sounds and things as interfaces that 
will replace, transform, augment and reinforce the role of printed text. As lawyers we 
have been so immersed in text that it has become a part of our identity, making it next 
to impossible to concede the materiality of law’s present embodiment. Ambient Law 
aims to do just that. In admitting that its workings depend in part on the materiality of 
its technological embodiment Ambient Law challenges both lawyers and legislators to 
rethink what it means to create and sustain legal norms.    
 
4.2 Top-down approach versus self-regulation? 
One might think that the problems caused by the emerging computational 
infrastructure require either strong legal code or industry self-regulation to sustain 
core rights and freedoms such as privacy, non-discrimination and due process. Hirsch 
briefly sums up these positions:48  
Two main camps dominate the debate. The first calls for government 
regulation. It seeks legislation that would set, or authorize regulators to set, 
detailed and strict limits on the ways that companies can collect data online, 
the types and amounts of personal information they can collect, and on the 
ways they can use this data. Proponents of this approach maintain that strong 
government regulation is necessary to protect unsuspecting Internet users 
against the self-interested behavior of Internet-based companies. The second 
camp, which has thus far won the day, argues that the market and industry 
self-regulation will yield better results than government rules. It believes that 
Internet businesses already have a market incentive to protect user privacy so 
as not to lose customers. Insofar as rules are necessary to correct for market 
failures this group believes that industry, not government, should set them. 
A number of objections can be made against the first option, as being a top-down 
approach or too slow or inflexible to provide adequate regulation of rapid 
technological change, or against the second option, as being a soft approach with a 
mistaken belief in free (but not necessarily fair) market self-regulation. Hirsch 
actually advocates a third approach, based on what he takes to be the European model 
of privacy protection: general and comprehensive data protection legislation, 
complemented by industry ‘codes of conduct’ that further interpret the scope and the 
implementation of the law, which are then made subject to government approval. He 
calls this co-regulation. 
It is important to explain how Ambient Law relates to this opposition and to its 
synthesis. Firstly, Ambient Law is not about the implementation of legal norms by 
means of their technical enforcement. The technological infrastructure is more than a 
means to achieve an end. Having specific affordances it will co-constitute the scope 
and the consequences of the legal norm it articulates. Writing down unwritten legal 
norms is not a matter of implementing them, but rather concerns their articulation in a 
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specific technology: that of the script and the printing press. Similarly, the hardwiring 
and ‘softwaring’ of written legal norms would not be a matter of implementing them, 
but rather concerns their articulation in the technical infrastructure of the smart 
environment.  
Second, just like the enactment of written legal norms, the articulation of legal norms 
in the novel infrastructure would require democratic legitimisation. If this were 
merely about technical implementation measures, the democratic element could be 
discarded as having been taken care of in the enactment of the written rule. As soon as 
we argue for the enactment of legal norms by articulating them in the novel ICT 
infrastructure, this will require democratic participation. Whereas in an oral culture 
democracy is a matter of consensual decision-making in a face-to-face assembly, 
scribal cultures often see the formation of proto-states where the literate class of 
scribes forms a buffer zone between ruler and ruled (which are often both illiterate).49 
The era of the printing press finally democratized literacy, enabling large polities to 
develop some form of representative and deliberative democracy. It may be that the 
era of interconnectivity warrants a further transformation of democracy that involves 
the novel infrastructure, especially the increasing always-on connectivity. Following a 
pragmatist account of democratic politics in the age of technological complexity, I 
would argue that the enactment of legal norms into an ICT infrastructure like that of 
smart environments would require participation of those who will suffer the 
consequences of relevant changes.50 This could for instance be inspired by some form 
of participatory Technology Assessment or Constructive Technology Assessment.51 
Such novel forms of democratic participation could prevent Ambient Law from being 
imposed on designers, investors, providers and users of smart environments, requiring 
them to live with a technological fix that is invented by government officials.  
As long as most lawyers and most legislators are not literate in terms of the 
computational infrastructure that nourishes smart environments we cannot expect 
them to come up with detailed and sustainable socio-technical solutions. In that sense 
Ambient Law cannot be based on a top-down format of democratic government. This, 
however, does not imply that we should resort to industry self-regulation, or combine 
such self-regulation with a general legislative framework (co-regulation). All three 
formats seem to understand the legislator as a typical governmental, top-down 
regulator and the industry as the actor whose behaviour must be regulated. From the 
perspective of democratic theory the legislator should not be reduced to a department 
of a top-down government structure but rather be understood – and empowered – as 
the embodiment of a people that speaks for and legislates for itself. As Hirsch 
demonstrates, many authors believe that giving the industry free reign has not 
worked, because there is no incentive to abandon profitable practices if one’s 
competitors will then take over. A more attractive strategy could in fact be to engage 
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the industry by levelling the playing field, thus allowing businesses to provide 
creative solutions to the requirements set by the legislator.52 This sounds a bit like 
having your cake (good privacy standards) and eating it too (allowing business to 
innovate and come up with flexible solutions). The problem is that this assumes that 
citizens’ privacy in a smart environment can be arranged between a top-down 
government and the industry. AmLaw is not only more ambitious in believing that 
democratic legislation is more than power politics between governmental and 
industrial stakeholders, it should for that same reason also be more effective.  
Within the European context informational privacy is often seen as a form of 
informational self-determination, a term associated with the rulings of the German 
Constitutional Court and closely connected with the control theory on privacy.53 
Adding this to the previous analysis, we now have a quest for self-determination of 
the data subject, one for self-regulation of the industry, one for top-down regulation 
by the government and one for co-regulation between government and the industry. 
One does wonder how all this relates to the idea of self-government of a people 
(democracy) constraint by the rights and liberties of individual citizens (the Rule of 
Law). If government is there to represent its citizens then legislation must be a form 
of self-regulation; in a democracy legislation can only be top-down after being 
bottom-up.54 What could it mean if the industry regulates itself in contravention of 
how citizens would like to rule themselves? And what could it mean if the industry 
regulates itself in ways that contravene individual rights and liberties? Do we assume 
that in practice the government and the industry operate outside the framework of 
democratic self-government and the Rule of Law?  
Individual self-determination, top-down legislation and industry self-regulation are all 
based on some kind of sovereign rule; either by the self, the government or the 
industry. Co-regulation seems an uneasy negotiation between a sovereign state that 
knows best what the nation needs and a sovereign industry that knows best what the 
market needs. Considering what is at stake, we should not be surprised if government 
is compromised by giving in to tough negotiations, whereas leading partners in the 
industry find ways to reconfigure the market to their own advantage, with help of the 
government. Alternatively, government may outsmart other stakeholders and impose 
restrictions that smother innovation and subdue the economic miracles that e-
commerce promises. All this sounds very familiar and pragmatic, but it is unclear how 
the deals struck in this context would benefit privacy as a private interest as well as a 
public good. The government obviously has its own reasons to invest in the 
computational turn to enhance its managerial efforts in the domain of e-government 
and to take care that the industry designs back-doors into its infrastructure for reasons 
of public security. If we stop attributing characteristics of the executive to the 
legislator which should in fact be a check on the administration, we may be able to 
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rephrase the issues in terms of the protection of privacy as a public good that cannot 
be traded with.  
 
4.3 Rule by technology and the Rule of Law 
Lessig must be credited with an impressive analysis of the consequences of novel 
ICTs for constitutional law, privacy, copyright and for the interrelationships between 
law, market forces, social norms and computer code. Writing at the end of the ‘90s, he 
highlighted the truism that law does not have a monopoly on the regulation of human 
behaviour, adding computer code to the list of influences on human behaviour 
patterns. In his famous Code and other laws of cyberspace Lessig pointed out that 
lawyers, courts and legislators should not take for granted that written law has an 
unmediated capacity to regulate especially if the architecture of our physical or virtual 
space sets defaults that nudge or force people in other directions. As a constitutional 
lawyer he emphasized the implications for the capacity of the law to safeguard 
constitutional rights and liberties, which brings his work close to my own concern for 
legal protection by design. I do find his distinction between law, market forces and 
social norms problematic, because these phenomena overlap. Market forces can be 
understood as being co-constituted by a particular type of social norms, deriving from 
institutional and legal constraints that co-constitute ‘the market’. Legal norms that are 
not also social norms have difficulty to be sustained without continuous monitoring. 
This is not to say that all legal norms are also social norms, but especially in a 
democracy – where those who issue legal norms ‘are’ in a sense the same as those 
whose interactions should be guided by these norms – all legal norms are meant to 
become social norms.  
Over and against the more usual ‘command and control’ model of law, which seems 
to have inspired Hirsch’s notion of governmental regulation, Glastra van Loon 
developed an ‘expectancy model’ of legal norms.55 He explains that legal norms (or 
rules) enable citizens to anticipate what behaviour both the government and their 
fellow citizens can legitimately expect from them. Van Loon distinguished between 
an imperative and a normative aspect of rules in general. In modern legal systems all 
legal norms have an imperative aspect, which is related to the positivity of law and its 
relation to government authority and the monopoly of violence. It means that in the 
end of the day citizens can call upon the government to enforce valid legal norms 
against their fellows. Under the Rule of Law legal norms can also be enforced against 
the government, which requires an internal division of sovereignty, allowing the 
courts to invoke government authority to call other parts of the government to 
account. The imperative aspect of legal norms entails a vertical relation between the 
issuer of a norm and the addressee. To ‘work’ however, legal norms must develop a 
normative aspect, which concerns the way subjects relate to each other. This plays out 
in the horizontal relationship between citizens who can call each other to account 
when specific legitimate expectations are not met. Under the Rule of Law the 
normative aspect also guides the relationship between citizens and government, who 
are both subject to the imperative force of legal norms. The fact that legal norms 
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should generally have a normative aspect is not only related to their effectiveness but 
also to their legitimacy. As suggested above, in a democracy all legal norms are 
supposedly issued by those to whom they apply. The fictional character of this 
assumption is not fictional in the sense of imaginary, but in the sense of constructive; 
it is a productive fiction that requires legislation to live up to certain standards. The 
fiction entails a norm about the content of legislation: it should be composed or 
designed in a way that takes into account the serious concerns of all citizens, even if 
compromises must be reached.  
How does the normativity that is inherent in technological artefacts or infrastructures 
relate to Van Loon’s analysis? Should we understand the possibility of enforcing 
certain behaviour patterns as imperative, while qualifying the possibility to set 
defaults that can be side-stepped as normative? I think that this would confuse 
matters. Though the possibility to enforce behaviour can be termed deterministic for 
or constitutive of these behaviours, it has little to do with the imperative aspect. In 
law, we can also distinguish between regulative and constitutive rules. A constitutive 
rule means that when you violate it you cannot achieve your objective; in a sense you 
cannot violate the rule because in that case it refuses to attach legal consequences to 
your actions. In many jurisdictions you cannot be married without registering the 
marriage, violating this rule means that you are not married. A regulative rule like the 
prohibition of speeding or causing damage means that violation will be fined or will 
be followed by an obligation to pay compensation. Both rules have an imperative 
aspect, since they were issued by the legislator. Hopefully both rules have a normative 
aspect, meaning that people will feel obliged towards each other to take the rule as a 
standard. In the case of constitutive rules this may be even more important, because if 
many people ‘get married’ without registering their marriage the legal norm may lose 
its meaning as such and possibly erode the authority of the legislator. Technological 
normativity can be constitutive or regulative, but for such normativity to be 
complemented with an imperative aspect the norm must be enacted by the legislator. 
This means that the legislator has paid explicit attention to the norm that is at stake. 
Either the legislator has articulated a rule in spoken and/or written human language 
and discussed with computer scientists, engineers and designers how this rule can be 
articulated in the technological artefact that may otherwise counter the rule, or the 
legislator has decided that a particular technological device has normative 
consequences that require reconstruction or redesign to generate a normativity that 
does not violate constitutional safeguards.  
In his inaugural lecture Leenes discusses what he calles ‘technoregulation’, which he 
defines as  
deliberate employment of technology to regulate human behaviour56  
or  
technology with intentionally built-in mechanisms to influence people’s 
behaviour.57 
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Leenes then differentiates between techno-regulation authored by the legislator and 
intrinsic techno-regulation, which he apparently defines as authored by a private 
actor. In line with his definition of techno-regulation he considers both as forms of 
deliberate, intentional regulation. This comes close to what Latour has called 
delegation: certain tasks are delegated to a technology that either forces or induces the 
targeted behaviour. As Leenes notes, as long as the initiative or the endorsement for 
such delegation is with the legislator there seems to be some kind of democratic 
legitimacy, whereas this is debatable when a private actor delegates his terms of 
service to a technology thereby extending his own control in a way that violates rights 
of the buyer or user of the service.  
From the previous it should be obvious that the technological normativity that is the 
focus of this article is not necessarily part of techno-regulation. The problem with 
techno-regulation is that is restricts itself to intentional delegation whereas the 
normativity that is generated by proactive computational infrastructures may not have 
been intended. Ambient Law focuses on what we could call the normative affordances 
of the proactive computational infrastructure, without assuming that any one person 
or organization had the intention of inscribing such norms. We tend to define 
unintended consequences as side-effects, but one of the crucial implications of this 
novel infrastructure seems to be that it becomes hard to discern the consequences of 
one’s actions – whether or not intended. Maybe the side effects will have a bigger 
impact than whatever were the intended effects. For Ambient Law to make a 
difference it should not restrict itself to techno-regulation but investigate the 
normative affordances of the infrastructure, before requiring alternative designs to 
protect citizens against violations of their constitutional rights.  
This is also the reason why I prefer to speak of ‘legal protection by design’ instead of 
‘techno-regulation’. In using the term legal I emphasize the role of the democratic 
legislator as well as the possibility to contest the way the norm affects human 
behaviour. In using the term protection I emphasize that this is not about 
implementing written legal rules by means of technological enforcement. I also avoid 
the term regulation that easily resonates the top-down managerial governmental 
model discussed in the previous section. Finally, in using the term design I emphasize 
that this is not only about engineering but also about human-machine-interfacing, 
highlighting that such inscription of legal norms is not only a matter of technique but 
also an art.   
Basically, I want to prevent a rule by technology that views technology as a neutral 
tool to achieve policy goals, which fits easily with seeing law as a neutral instrument. 
Neither law nor technology can be used as mere means to specified ends. This would 
reduce either of them to administration or discipline, as Leenes clearly shows. Neither 
rule by law nor rule by technology is what fits constitutional democracy. Rule by Law 
can incorporate articulation of legal norms in written law, in unwritten law and in 
hardwired/’softewared’ law.  
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5 Closing remarks 
In this contribution I contrast the notion of Ambient Law with Lessig’s regulatory mix 
of market forces, social norms, legal code and computer code, with Hirsch’s 
opposition between governmental command & control models versus self-regulation 
and with Leenes’ discussion of techno-regulation. 
To fine-tune the contrast I explore three well-known objections against regulation by 
means of technology, which may or may not refute the argument for Ambient Law. 
The first concerns the idea that legislation should be technology neutral and should 
therefore abstain from aligning itself with a particular technology. In reply, I have 
argued that technology neutrality must not be confused with technology indifference. 
Since modern law is already articulated in the technology of the script we must face 
the fact that the emergence of a novel information and communication infrastructure 
may render written law ineffective, especially in the case of the legal protection of 
human rights. The second is directed against using technology as a tool of legislation 
because it reinforces the command and control model of regulation,  which is deemed 
to suffocate innovation and to create a host of problems with compliance. In reply, I 
have argued that seeing democratic legislation as a form of top-down command and 
control implies a flawed understanding of what constitutional democracy stands for. 
The top-down model of governmental rule is based on a problematic notion of 
sovereignty that fits the 18th century police state rather than states that embrace 
democracy under the Rule of Law. Though I do not deny that a democratic legislator 
may be hijacked by executive pressures or by transnational market forces, the way out 
is not to grant private stakeholders the freedom to design their own rules of the game. 
Instead, alternative, upstream democratic participation processes must be generated 
that allow stakeholders as well as citizens to get involved in the design of the novel 
ICT infrastructure. The third objection understands Ambient Law as a way of using 
technology to enforce legal norms, which would indeed be a form of administration or 
discipline rather than law. In reply I have argued that Ambient Law should steer clear 
of automated implementation of legal norms, and instead recreate an information and 
communications infrastructure that scaffolds the private and public autonomy of 
individual citizens. 
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